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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
It is submitted that when a municipality takes out
insurance, the premiums are calculated in accordance to the
amount of loss the municipality may incur, taking into
account the size of the municipality, the number of functions
it engages in, and the fact that the municipality will be
immune from most suits by acting in its governmental
capacity. To allow recovery on all torts, based on the mere
fact that the governmental unit has taken out liability
insurance, can have no other effect than to raise the cost of
premiums considerably. Such a result would in turn defeat
the purpose of governmental immunity by indirectly apply-
ing public funds toward payment of a greater number of
damage claims.
Under the circumstances shown,- it is not necessarily a
waste or misuse of public funds to procure insurance while
retaining governmental immunity.
R. GORDon NESVIG
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-CONsTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHTS - RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF MAPP
v. OHIO-Plaintiff's hotel room was searched by state
officers without a warrant or the plaintiff's consent. Evidence
obtained in the illegal search was used against the plaintiff
to convict him of murder. The plaintiff made no objection
regarding the admissibility of the evidence in court. In
reliance on Mapp v. Ohio,1 the accused appealed by federal
habeas corpus. 2 The United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit, held, two judges dissenting, that the United
States Supreme Court opinion declaring evidence obtained by
state officers from an illegal search and seizure applies
retroactively and prisoner's failure to object to evidence so
obtained was excusable and did not result in a forfeit of his
constitutional rights. Hall v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary,
313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1963).
The Supreme Court has long held that the use of illegally
obtained evidence is unconstitutional and cannot be admitted
1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958).
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RECENT CASES
in any federal cqurt. 3  In 1949, Wolf v. Colorado4 declared
that the constitutional privacy guarantee extended to the
states, but did not impose on the states the same exclusionary
rule of evidence by which the federal courts are bound. Mapp
v. Ohio' overruled this decision and put the admissibility
of evidence on a strict constitutional ground, 6 excluding the
introduction in state courts of evidence obtained by illegal
search and seizure.
This state exclusionary rule has presented the problem,
should it be applied retroactively? Strict constitutional
interpretations that have not been expressly restricted to
prospective application have generally been given retroactive
effect. Prospective application is usually the total scope
of a new statute; a similar construction being given to
decisions which, if applied retroactively, would cause hard-
ship.9
The apparent retroactive effect given to Griffin v. Illi-
nois, 10 has not been appllied to Mapp v. Ohio; although both
decisions rested on a violation of due process. The majority
of the courts have refused to allow retroactive review because
no objection to the illegally obtained evidence was made in
the trial court.1" Most courts that have allowed review
have given Mapp a prospective interpretation only. 12 These
courts have based their decisions on the wording of the Mapp
3. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
4. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
5. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
6. Vd., at 660. Mr. Justice Clark summed up the court's stand: "Having
once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amend-
inent is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure
against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is therefore, constitu-
tional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty
promise. . . . Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the in-
dividual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him ....
7. See Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958). The
Supreme Court herein held that a 1935 conviction which denied the indig-
ent appellant a free transcript violated his constitutional right as was
.declared by Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See generally Stimson,
Itetroactive application of Law-A Problem In Constitutional Law, 38 Mich.
L. Rev. 30 (1939).
8. Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112 (1952); Claridge Apartments
Co. v. Comm'r., 323 U.S. 141 (1944).
9. Gt. No. Ry. v. Sunburst Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932); Safarik v. Udall,
304 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
10. Supra note 7.
11. United States ex. rel. Gregory v. People of State of N.Y., 195 F.
Supp. 527 (D.C. N.Y. 1961); Moore v. State, 146 So. 2d 734 (Ala. 1962);
Shorey v. State, 227 Md. 385, 177 A.2d 245 (1962).
12. E.g. People v. Figueroa, 220 N.Y.S.2d 131 (County Ct. 1961).
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case.13 Another reason is that those previously brought to
trial were convicted on the authority of case law then in
effect.14 Retroactive application has extended only to those
cases pending appeal when the Mapp decision was rendered."
The Supreme Court, aware of the retroactive effect given
to its prior decisions, failed to expressly limit the newly
enunciated constitutional right to the future. In such light
and based on the constitutional question involved, at least
one other case has declared that Mapp v. Ohio applies retro-
actively.1 6 The failure to object to the admissibility of evi-
dence should not be a waiver of the constitutional right,
for under these circumstances, justice requires a departure
from the ordinary waiver rule.
17
North Dakota has held according to the nonexclusionary
rule regarding admissibility of illegally obtained evidence.",
They must now adopt the exclusionary rule set out in Mapp
v. Ohio. Pertaining to the question of retroactive applica-
tion it is submitted that the decision of the court in the in-
stant case is the proper interpretation.
NEIL A. MCEWEN
INSURANCE - EXTENT OF LOSS AND LIABILITY OF INSURER-
DEFENSE OF ACTIONS - Defendant insurance company
issued an automobile liability policy to insured and certi-
fied that the policy complied with provisions of the financial
responsibility law. Subsequently plaintiff sustained losses
caused by insured's negligence, and following unsuccessful
negotiations with defendant, instituted proceedings against
insured. Insured failed to notify defendant of the impending
suit as required by the policy; subsequently plaintiff recover-
ed a default judgment. Upon defendant's refusal to satisfy
13. E.g. State v. Long, 71 N.J. Super. 583, 177 A.2d 609 (1962).
14. Commonwealth v. Mancini, 198 Pa. Super. 642, 184 A.2d 279 (1962).
15. E.g. People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179 N.E.2d 478 (1961).
16. Hurst v. People of State of Cal., 211 F. Supp. 387 (N.D. Cal. 1962):
See Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886) wherein Mr. Justice Field
expressed an analogous theory: "An unconstitutional act is not a law: it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates
no office; it Is, in legal contemplation, qs inoperative as though it had
never been passed."
17. See, Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947); See generally, Broeder,
The Decline and Fall of Wolf v. Colorado, 41 Neb. L. Rev. 185, 209 (1961).
18. State v. Fahn, 53 N.D. 203, 205 N.W. 67 (1925).
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